The purpose of this POLICY PAPER is to examine empirically the relative impact that a regulatory mandate like network neutrality would have on high-cost areas and to compare that relative burden to lower-cost urban areas. We find areas that are, on average, high-cost could be disproportionately affected by imposition of these mandates, even if the cost of complying with that mandate does not vary by geography. Using publicly available network cost models and data, we show that under plausible conditions, while network neutrality mandates negatively impact broadband deployment in all geographic areas regardless of average cost characteristics, such rules could disproportionately impact broadband deployment in high-cost areas. Moreover, our analysis that suggests the differential reduction in service availability for high-cost rural areas is six times as much as in lower cost, more urbanized markets. †
I. Introduction
By all accounts, the deployment of broadband services to all corners of America and "network neutrality" have become two key issues in the current debate over rewriting the nation's communications laws. But no analysis has been performed on the impact that a "network neutrality" regulatory mandate would have on the incentives and ability of firms to deploy broadband services in high-cost areas. We show in this POLICY PAPER that while network neutrality regulation would materially impact broadband deployment generally, such regulation could disproportionately and negatively impact broadband deployment by a sizeable amount in areas that are, on average, high-cost areas (such as rural markets)-at a magnitude of six times the impact relative to areas with lower costs (or more urbanized markets) under plausible conditions and assumptions.
It is critical for policymakers to understand this relatively large impact that network neutrality mandates could have on households in high-cost areas, as the nation's leaders from both the Democrats 1 and the Republicans 2 have called for broadband services to be available throughout the country. 1 For example, Senator Byron Dorgan has long championed broadband deployment to rural areas, noting that "Ensuring that all Americans have the technological capability is essential in this digital age. It is not only an issue of fairness, but it is also an issue of economic survival. *** No longer must economic growth be defined by geographic fiat." Statement by Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) on the introduction of S 2307, the Rural Broadband Enhancement Act (March 28, 2000) (available at: http://www.techlawjournal.com/cong106/broadband/20000328dor.htm). Similarly, FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps has said that "access to broadband is absolutely essential if (Footnote Continued. . . .) Indeed, billions of dollars are spent annually to subsidize the availability of communications services in high-cost areas of the country. Since 1998, the federal universal service fund has spent $21.85 billion to support the construction and maintenance of telephone networks to high-cost areas of the country, and disbursements for high-cost support in 2006 are expected to top $4.2 billion. Given this level of commitment (and requests from the high-tech industry that more should be spent to subsidize 100 Mbps broadband networks), 3 policymakers should clearly seek to avoid implementing public policies that would disproportionately affect the availability of communications services in rural America. 4 Policies that reduce broadband generally should likewise be scrutinized, since such policies will not improve the relative economic strength of the United States. 5 every area of this country is going to be able to compete for high-quality jobs and investment." Remarks of FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps, "Disruptive Technology … Disruptive Regulation," (Feb. 24, 2004 ) (available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-244356A1.pdf) at 4, 6 ("we need to develop a real national plan for broadband deployment"). Of course, there are high-cost components of nearly any defined geographic market and it is these households that are harmed by cost-increasing regulations. Relative harm across markets essentially relates to the proportion of "high-cost households" in a given market.
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There are varying reports as to the exact ranking of the United States for broadband penetration compared to other countries. For example, according to the OECD, the United States ranks 12 th in broadband penetration among member countries as of December 2005 (see (Footnote Continued. . . .) The challenge of bringing broadband service to all corners of America is dominated by one unchangeable fact: it is very costly to deploy and operate broadband networks and this is particularly the case in sparsely-populated areas. Network Neutrality mandates would, almost by definition, make broadband networks either more costly to build or less valuable (or both). As we described in POLICY BULLETIN NO. 16, the potential size of these increased costs, according to some estimates, is staggering, and can be has high as several hundred dollars per month. 6 The revenue-reducing capability of such rules for the network operators is another important component of the neutrality debate because some network neutrality proposals would essentially prohibit network owners from collecting from certain users of the networks (content companies like Google or Microsoft), even if such charges would be the most efficient means of charging for access to the network. Increasing the cost of designing and operating broadband networks or reducing their revenue potential would certainly have a negative impact on the economics of deploying broadband everywhere.
But the extent of that impact on households in high-cost areas, and comparing that relative burden to homes in lower cost, more urbanized areas, is an empirical question that we seek to answer in this POLICY PAPER. Our analysis estimates the relative impact that a regulatory mandate like network neutrality would have in areas that have different cost characteristics. We find that areas that can be described as high-cost areas (on average) would be disproportionately affected by imposition of these mandates, even if the cost of complying with that mandate does not vary by geography. In Section II, we present a conceptual framework for this analysis, and Section III attempts to calculate the disproportionate impact that a network neutrality mandate will have. Using publicly available network cost models and data, we show that under plausible conditions, while cost-increasing or revenue-reducing network neutrality mandates will materially impact broadband deployment in all geographic areas, such rules can be expected to disproportionately impact broadband deployment in high-cost areas and potentially by a significant amount. Our particular analysis indicates the differential impact is about six times as much as in lower cost, more urbanized areas.
II. Conceptual Framework
In this POLICY PAPER, we set out to explore the impact that increased costs (or reduced value) of a broadband network caused by network neutrality mandates could have on the eventual deployment of such network in certain areas, particularly high-cost areas. We demonstrate in this section how an increase in costs of building or operating a network could have a disproportionate impact on deployment decisions in particular areas even if the cost change from the regulatory mandate is identical across all areas. We can, in general, represent the effect an increase in costs has upon broadband deployment with some simple graphics. In Figure 1 , we illustrate the economics of deployment. For the figure, we assume the broadband service provider must expend a fixed costs C to build network to a particular household (while C is incremental to each house, it is a fixed capital expense in that it is spent only once and is required to provide service). The cost of building a wireline broadband network in the United States varies widely and to a large extent is driven by population density. The line labeled C in Figure 1 demonstrates this relationship-the vertical axis measures the costs to build out to a household and the horizontal axis is the percentage of households passed, where households are ranked by the fixed cost of constructing the network to [Number 25 Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org each house. 7 Since the homes are sorted by C, the C curve slopes upward, with the lowest cost households on the far left and the highest cost households on the far right.
The horizontal line labeled V is the expected value of the household to the broadband network operator. The value might be considered the net revenues (or gross profits) that a firm expects to generate from each particular household that it passes. It is important to note that V represents the "value" of the network to the network service provider-effectively the present value of gross profits that the firm can realize from building and operating the network. 8 For our purposes, we assume that the value of a broadband network for residential consumers is essentially unrelated to the underlying capital cost of constructing network. This assumption seems reasonable, since there is little reason to think that consumers in high-cost areas are willing to pay substantially more (or less) for voice, video and high-speed broadband data services than consumers in lower cost areas. As a result, the V curve is flat. 9 The network firm will build a network to a household as long as the expected value meets or exceeds the fixed costs of serving household i (where V " C i ). This equilibrium occurs where the C and V lines intersect, rendering the equilibrium percentage of households passed of h*. Households to the right of h* are too costly for the private sector to serve given expected benefits V. The shaded area in Figure 1 essentially represents a type of "gap" or "shortfall"-the 7 In other words, the curve labeled C is the fixed capital cost for the household h and not the sum of fixed capital costs at h. For simplicity, we illustrate the distribution of the per-household fixed capital costs as linear across all households (with total households being H). We have normalized households by dividing by total households H so that the horizontal axis is measured on the unit interval (i.e., the lowest value is 0 and the highest value is 1 or 100%).
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As a result, in this conceptual framework, V only represents the net revenues from the network that the network service provider can actually collect from users of the network. It is not a statement of the complete "social" value of the network or the value that consumers would place upon the network. In analyzing a firm's build-out decision it is, of course, obvious that only the "value captured by the firm" is relevant to the firm's decisions.
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There may be differences in demand due to income, but, on average, there is no consistent relationship between costs and income. G. portion of the service area where the cost of building a network is greater than the private value of the network that can be captured as revenues by the network provider. Policymakers that seek to promote the broadest penetration level for broadband network should favor policies that seek to minimize the size of this triangle as much as possible (or utilize other regulatory tools such as subsidies to mitigate the adverse impact of this shortfall). Now, consider the effect of increasing the capital cost of deploying network through, say, network neutrality regulations. An increase in costs lowers the equilibrium penetration of broadband network. Figure 2 demonstrates this effect. If regulation increases the cost of the network deployment (by #C, with # meaning "a change in"), then the C curve shifts upward to C R (the latter being cost with "Regulation") as illustrated in Figure 2 . Now, the profit maximizing network operator builds to only h R homes, reducing deployment by #h homes. So, Figure 2 shows how increasing the cost of network deployment through regulation reduces the equilibrium number of homes passed. For ease of presentation, in Figure 2 we treat the effect of this regulatory mandate as an increase in capital cost to deploy network. But the same effect would be observed if the regulatory mandate effectively increased the incremental (or operating) cost of or reduced the revenue that the provider could collect from the network (by shifting the V curve to intersect C at z).
It is important to see that not only has the cost hike decreased broadband penetration from h * to h R, but the size of the shortfall shaded area has increased significantly. The "shortfall" between the cost of the network and the value of [Number 25
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org that network has increased, a development that would certainly make the goal of achieving universal access to broadband more costly to achieve.
Thus far, the conceptual argument is straightforward and intuitive, but our interest lies in the relative effect that cost increases has upon a particular category of households-those that are in high-cost areas (or areas with higher average cost of service). In particular, while our previous analysis clearly shows that a cost increase from a regulatory mandate decreases overall broadband deployment regardless of the level of cost, our focus in this paper is on whether that mandate would affect deployment disproportionately in areas that are, on average, high-cost compared to lower-cost markets.
We show now how the extent to which an increase in costs may differentially affect deployment across different areas. To do so, we illustrate the cost curves for two markets in Figure 3 . In Panel A, we have a market in which the costs of deployment do not vary widely across homes so that the slope of the curve C is low (the curve is relatively flat). Panel B of this figure shows a market in which the costs of deployment vary widely across homes so that the slope of C is high (or relatively steep). 10 The two cost curves are drawn so that the point where the V curve intersects the C curves at the same household penetration point, h * , and the two markets have the same average cost of deployment.
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The market of Panel B might be an area in which there is a densely populated urban core but some extremely high-cost households on the fringes (such as a smattering of mountaintop homes in Southern California). This distribution of homes would render a non-linear curve, however, which begins as a relatively flat curve and then rises sharply as homes passed approaches 100%. Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org homes passed (h), ranked by cost While both markets start with the same equilibrium level of network construction and same average cost per home, the impact of a regulatory mandate differs between markets. In particular, the market with the low slope ( Figure 3 , Panel A) will see a substantial decrease in households passed compared to the other market shown with a relatively steep cost curve. Figure 4 shows how a regulatory change that increases the costs of building or operating the network by the same amount for all households passed alters homes passed in two different markets that are alike in many ways (average cost and penetration) except for the slopes of their C curves. To illustrate the cost increase, the C curves in Figure 4 have been increased to C R . As we illustrated in Figure 2 , this increase in cost will decrease deployment in both markets, but Figure 4 shows that the market in Panel A sees a much more substantial decrease in network construction in response to an identical change in costs across markets. [Number 25
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Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org homes passed (h), ranked by cost This analysis reveals that a fixed increase in costs, which applies to all households equally, can affect deployment in areas differently (but always reduces deployment). The reason for this differential impact is the slope of the cost curve (C) in each particular market at the point where V intersects that curve (for these linear curves, the slope is constant). As Figure 4 reveals, if the C curve is relatively flat at the intersection with V (a small slope), then even a tiny change in fixed costs will have a substantial impact on homes passed. Alternately, if the curve is steep at V (the slope is large), then the percentage of homes passed is not as sensitive to changes in costs. As shown in this example, the relative deployment response is not a function of average cost or initial penetration (which are assumed identical in the figures), but is driven solely by the slope of the C curve. Thus, if we know the slope of the curve at and around some point, then we can make estimates of the relative responses of network deployment to changes in costs across a variety of markets.
This analysis indicates that deployment response is not directly related to the average cost of provision (since average costs are identical in Figures 3 and 4) , but rather the response is related to the shape of the cost distribution. Markets, however defined, that have large proportions of high-cost households will typically have a flatter cost distribution (such as market A in Figure 3 and 4). More urbanized markets will have a very flat cost distribution over much of the range, but as penetration approaches 100% the distribution curve becomes very steep (since there are typically some high-cost customers in every market). Thus, systematic differences in deployment responses between low-and high-cost markets depends not on whether they are low-or high-cost per se, but on the systematic relationship between the slope of the cost distributions and average cost. So, we have a question that cannot be answered by theory but is empirical in nature.
This linkage between response and the slope of C is important because it indicates a very useful tool of empirical analysis. If we can calculate these slopes for particular markets, then we can make certain predictions about the extent to which a regulatory policy might disproportionately impact deployment in that particular market and compare that impact on other markets with different characteristics. It is possible, for example, to analyze whether a regulatory mandate might disproportionately affect deployment in certain areas, such as high-cost areas, or urban areas, or states, or even by the service area of a particular local telephone company.
To develop this tool, however, we need granular, cost data that allows us to calculate the slopes of these cost curves. Complicating this analysis is the fact that, unlike our figures, the actual network cost curves in markets are highly non-linear; as a result, the slope in unique at each point along the curve. Fortunately, publicly-available network cost models have been created that do in fact estimate the fixed costs of building networks in various markets throughout the country. In Section III, we demonstrate how we can use this data to analyze and effectively calculate the slopes of these cost curves around some point V.
With this data, we also calculate an index of the relative burden between lowcost and high-cost markets. While all increases in costs should be expected to reduce deployment, this analysis will show whether the burden of an increase cost would fall on high-cost areas well beyond what an equal impact on markets would render.
III. Simulation Data and Methodology
In recent years, for the purpose of distributing subsidies and setting unbundled element rates, the Federal Communications Commission and industry have developed and utilized cost models that effectively estimate the costs of building a communications network in the United States. For some models, cost estimates provided all the way down to the "Census Block Group" level, which are relatively small geographic areas established by the United States Census. In 1990, there were about 230,000 Census Block Groups ("CBG") in the United States, so the network cost analysis is fairly granular. We can utilize this data and these models to estimate the slope of the fixed cost curves (C) that we describe in Section II above. With this information, we can determine whether or not, on average, areas with higher average costs are disproportionately and negatively affected by network neutrality rules (or any other regulatory mandate). [Number 25
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org 
A. Data
To conduct the empirical analysis, we first collected the CBG loop cost estimates (L) for a large number of local exchange carriers using the HAI cost model. 11 Our sample was constructed by choosing states randomly and including all carriers in the state with data available. The result of this procedure is significant diversity in geography and costs. In our sample, there are about 95 million access lines and about half of all CBGs are represented. 12 Once the data is collected, we calculate a cost index (u) for each CBG by dividing the CBG loop cost by the sample mean loop cost. The distribution of u is an index that measures the C values illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 , though in reality the distribution of costs is nonlinear rather than linear as illustrated in those figures. We then use the average of this index for each carrier in each state as a measure of relative costs across markets. For each market, we have an average cost index of ! (or "u bar"). In summarizing our results, we will use this cost index (!) as the descriptor of each carrier/market. If the cost index ! is large, then the market is considered a "high cost" market, on average. If ! is low, then the market is a relatively "low cost" market, on average. The mean of ! is 1.00 and the ! series has a range of 0.46 to 2.10, so we have in our sample a wide range of average costs.
B. Results
As we discuss in Section II above, to assess the impact of Network Neutrality regulations on different markets, our task is to measure and compare the deployment response to a particular cost change (what is #h in response to #C?). To make this calculation, we must first compute h U , which is equilibrium number 11 HAI Cost Model Version 5.0, which was the last version of this model to provide nationwide estimates of costs. We use the HAI model because it provides cost estimates down to the CBG level, whereas the FCC's Synthesis Model results are provided at the Wire Center level only. The two models produce highly comparable estimates of relative loop costs, with the two series having a very high correlation coefficient. of homes passed in the Unregulated environment in each market that we study. To make this calculation, we need to assume some value (V) for the network, and V must be on the same scale as our cost index ! (with the mean of ! being 1.00).
We initially set V equal to 1.6 and do so because it is this value that produces an average homes passed rate of 50% (with a homes passed penetration rate ranging from a minimum of 26% to a maximum of 62%). 13 Clearly, an average penetration of 50% (and maximum of 62%) is low when discussing broadband network deployment, but setting V equal to 1.6 allows us to establish a lower bound response differential to cost changes. As shown in sensitivity analysis, larger values of V only strengthen the relationship found at V = 1.6. Nothing prohibits considering values of V less then 1.6, except as V gets smaller the ratio of value to costs gets so small that the network is barely deployed even in an unregulated market.
After computing h U for the 51 markets in our sample using these inputs, we then compute homes passed in the regulated environment (h R ) by raising the capital cost of deployment in all markets by the same small, fixed amount (#C) as we did in the conceptual analysis in the previous section. So that #C is constant across markets, we set #C equal to 5% of V (since V is equal across and constant in all markets) and then compute h R . (This calculation again illustrates that changes in C can be equivalent to changes in V).
With both h U and h R computed, we can then determine whether or not there is any relationship between the change in household penetration (#h, or the difference between h U and h R ) and the average cost index (!). Essentially, this comparison will determine whether high-cost (often rural) markets are more or less affected by network neutrality regulations than their low-cost counterparts. We define
, which is always a non-negative number (h U will equal or exceed h R in all circumstances). 14 Higher values of #h imply larger percentagepoint reductions in the homes passed rate in a given market. 13 This assumption implies that a network company would have gross margin of about $1.60 for $100 in network investment. Press stories indicate that AT&T is spending about $250 per line to upgrade to IPTV. At V = 1.6, this assumes that the additional margin from the upgrade will be only $4 per month, which is probably lower than that expected by AT&T. Thus, setting V = 1.6 is conservative.
14 The calculation #h could be zero, however, if the change leads to no reduction in homes passed because V > u for all households with or without regulation.
We use three different tools of statistical analysis to examine the relationship between this change in penetration (#h) and the index of average costs (!). First, Figure 5 provides the scatter plot and linear fit of the relationship between #h and !. As shown in the figure, it is typically the case that the higher are average costs in a market (!), the larger is the reduction in network deployment. Thus, there is reason to believe that network neutrality regulations will disproportionately harm high-cost, rural areas. A second way to analyze this relationship is to compute the simple correlation coefficient between #h and !. 15 The correlation coefficient has values between -1 and 1. If the correlation coefficient is zero, then the two variables exhibit no linear relationship. As the correlation coefficient gets closer to 1 or -1, however, the two series exhibit strong positive or negative correlation. The computed correlation coefficient between the two series #h and ! is 0.66, which indicates a strong positive linear correlation. The correlation coefficient thus indicates that there is a high linear correlation between the reduction in network deployment and average costs of network, and confirms that network deployment is typically (though not always) reduced more in high-cost, rural areas.
Our findings of a strong relationship between #h and ! are again confirmed by using least squares regression. The trend line in Figure 5 is based on least squares regression
where the ( are estimated parameters and & is the disturbance term. As shown in Figure 5 , the slope of the line estimated for this data is positive (( 1 > 0), indicating disproportionate harm in high-cost, rural areas from Network Neutrality regulations. The slope coefficient is statistically different from zero at better than the 1% level (t-stat = 6.12).
C. The "Relative Burden" Index
Our results establish that there is a strong relationship between the change in network penetration caused by a regulatory mandate and the average network cost index of a market. In other words, we can say that a regulatory mandate that increases the costs of building a broadband network will disproportionately and adversely affect broadband deployment in high-cost areas. It should not be a surprise to policymakers that an increase in network costs will decrease network deployment; what might be a surprise is the extent to which these increases costs will disproportionately affect high-cost areas, even if the costs of complying with the regulatory mandate do not vary by geography.
Finding that high-cost areas will be disproportionately affected is important enough in itself, but "by how much" is an inevitable follow-up question to this conclusion. It is possible to provide a rough estimate the extent of this disproportionate impact on rural, high-cost areas.
Our estimate of disproportionate impact, which we call the "relative burden index," is intuitive from a policy perspective. The availability of broadband service in all areas of the country is a national policy goal, so it would be reasonable to assume that policymakers would want their policies to apply with equal impact across markets. That is, if policymakers choose to impose a regulatory mandate that results in lower broadband penetration, then rural markets should not be burdened with more than their "fair share" of that burden. Stated differently, the probability that a household does not have access to a modern broadband
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The results we calculate above can be used to compute this "relative burden index." To compute this relative burden index, we first compute the share of total homes in the sample for (particular definitions of) low-cost markets (! ) 0.75) and high-cost markets (! " 1.25), which are labeled N HC and N LC (where subscripts "HC" and "LC" indicate high cost or low cost). Then, we compute the share of total homes passed lost to regulation for the high-cost and low-cost markets, which we label L HC and L LC . The index of relative burden is
The index BURDEN has an intuitive interpretation. If BURDEN = 4.0, for example, then high-cost markets bear four-times the burden from network neutrality regulations as do low-cost markets in terms of the reduction in homes passed. Put another way, if the index is 4.0, then a home in a high-cost market is four-times more likely not to have access to the network than if the home was in a low-cost market based on the imposition of network neutrality mandates. An index of 4.0 would be found, for example, if the percentage of total homes in high-cost markets is 10% and in low-cost markets is 40%, yet the high-cost and low-cost markets each contain 20% of the homes not passed due to network neutrality regulations [= (0.2/0.1)/(0.2/0.4)]. Thus, high-cost markets have 20% of the homes lost to regulation but only 10% of the homes, whereas the low-cost markets have only 20% of the homes lost to regulation but 40% of total homes. The impact in high-cost markets is, then, four times larger than low-cost markets.
Our calculations above permit us to calculate BURDEN for the network neutrality mandate as follows:
This statement is true regardless of the initial level of homes passed, since the percentage change in homes passed is computed using total homes. Thus, network neutrality regulation burdens high-cost markets more than lowcost markets by a factor of 6.31. Moreover, BURDEN rises if we use more extreme definitions of "low" and "high" cost. If we define high-cost markets as those with ! " 1.5 (markets with average cost more than 50% of the mean) and reduce the low-cost market boundary to ! ) 0.50 (markets with average cost only 50% of the mean), then BURDEN = 16.93. BURDEN is consistently above 1.00 for any sensible definition of low-and high-cost. Even if we define low-and high-cost as being below or above the mean cost, then BURDEN = 4.47.
The disparate burden that a network neutrality mandate would impose on high-cost markets is substantial. Even though the costs of complying with a regulatory mandate may not vary by geography, broadband deployment in highcost areas will be disproportionately affected by that mandate. The disparate burden increases significantly in even high-cost markets.
D. Sensitivity Analysis
We have made a number of assumptions in our analysis, but our findings are robust to alternative assumptions. 17 One area where a sensitivity analysis is particularly warranted is the estimated value of a household in terms of gross profits, which form the basis for the V curve. In Table 1 , we present five different values of V (including 1.6) to evaluate the role the selection of V plays in our findings. As revealed in the table, the disproportionate harm to high-cost areas rises as V rises. 18
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As long as the actual C curve for deployment is proportional to our variable u, the disproportionate impact on rural areas remains, though its size may differ.
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Of course, as V gets smaller than 1.6, the relatively harm declines. When V is 0.8, the effect across markets is roughly equal (and inverted for values below 0.8). However, at V = 0.8, the average penetration of the service is only 34%, and as low as 12% in high-cost areas. It is little surprise that the deployment effect becomes small in high-cost areas when deployment is almost non-existent even in the unregulated state. As a technical matter, the relationship of V to #h suggests that low-cost markets typically have very flat C curves in the lower cost segments of their markets with sharply rising C curves as penetration approaches 100%. In contrast, the C curves of high-cost markets typically rise even in the lower cost areas but do not rise very steeply as penetration approaches 100%. One interpretation of the rising burden in V is that the more valuable the service (or, the higher the penetration in an unregulated environment), the greater will be the relative harm to high-cost markets for some given cost change. Since broadband is considered to a high-value service (indeed, the triple play is a $100+ bundle of services), our analysis suggests that the impact on high-cost areas from network neutrality regulations could be substantial.
E. Caveats
As with any theoretical or empirical analysis, the conclusions reported here are based in large part on the underlying assumptions of the model. We have assumed that the cost of deploying a modern broadband network is correlated with the forward-looking cost of deploying telephone network. We believe this assumption is reasonable, particularly in the case of fiber deployment. It is certainly possible to imagine networks (particularly hypothetical networks) which do not exhibit the expected cost properties with respect to household density, and in such cases our findings may change. Nevertheless, under the plausible framework we have set forth here, the results are robust.
IV. Conclusion
Increasing the costs of building or operating a broadband network by a regulatory mandate unquestionably will result in lower broadband network construction across the board. But our analysis shows that this decline in construction will not be evenly spread across the country as a whole-in fact, deployment in high-cost areas will be harmed disproportionately by any such cost-increasing mandate.
Using publicly available data and cost models, we show in this POLICY PAPER that a regulatory mandate like network neutrality could result in at least a sixfold relative reduction in broadband deployment in high-cost rural areas than in low-cost urban areas (under plausible conditions). In a very real way, the burden that a network neutrality mandate would create would be
